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Will and Ariel Durant state in the preface to their book, entitled The Lessons 
of History, that their aim in preparing the essay was not originality but 
inclusiveness" We expect that from historians. But, we also expect it from 
scientists and, more specifically oflate, those writing about human development. 
Within the past few years, many statements have been published concerning 
human development which have been misleading, out of context, or outright 
false. 
Human embryology is now in danger of being rewritten as a stratagem 
statement of current socio-Iegal, but also of late, even theological, issues. Unless 
the errors are corrected now, we will be in danger of entering a protracted period 
of false concepts concerning our own development. History records previous 
difficult periods; for example, when the theory of recapitulation, conceived by 
Haeckel in 1866, preoccupied biologists for decades.2 This became the 
Biogenetic Law which stated that our embryonic stages telescoped the 
morphology of lesser vertebrates. The laws of von Baer had been published 38 
years earlier, and had precluded such a theory. Correctly stated, embryonic stages 
of the vertebrates are simply similar in form.3 
The So-Called Pre-embryo 
The Reverend Richard A. McCormick has recently written an essay proposing 
a "new moral status," for a stage of development of the human embryo, called the 
"pre-embryo."· The pre-embryo theoretically extends from fertilization to a stage 
about 5 to 6 days post-fertilization and, he states, might be for that period of time 
not entitled to moral status.5 His new "moral status" is actually a reconsideration 
of the time granted for ensoulment by the Catholic Church.6 
The authenticity for the term pre-embryo is derived from a justification given 
by Grobstein: "greater accuracy in characterizing the initial phase of mammalian 
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and human development."7 McCormick states: "the term pre-embryo was 
adopted because the earliest stages of mammalian [sic] development primarily 
involve establishment of the non-embryonic trophoblast, rather than the 
formation of the embryo."8 This is an involuted statement and, in the case of the 
human, is not true. In the human the trophoblast does not appear until the 4th 
day. In the human the trophoblast and some, not all, of its derivatives are 
involved in establishing the placenta. While this is going on development of the 
embryo is certainly not arrested but proceeds apace. If in the early stages certain 
cells not directly involved in development of the embryo justify establishment of 
a pre-embryo state and possible reconsideration of ensoulment, what status might 
be established for the embryo, or the fetus, in which multitudes of cells, including 
massive numbers of brain cells, and others which are organized into whole 
structures, never become part of the fetus or the infant? Specifically, as nerve cells 
(neuroblasts) are rapidly dividing, forming the nervous system including the 
brain, many are dying.9,lo Additionally, many cells, not just nerve cells, are 
programmed for cell death in the embryo, many others in the fetus, and still 
others at all stages of life, post -birth. I I 
It is important to examine what has been, and is, common usage among those 
who are most familiar with the subject of human development, the 
embryologists. The most recent edition of Stedman's Medical Dictionary (1990) 
defines embryo as "an organism from conception until approximately the end of 
the second month," after which it is termed a fetus. 12 None of the established 
human embryology texts use the term pre-embryo, and it is not to be found in the 
scientific literature of human development. Bradley Patten, now deceased, but 
one of the renowned deans of human embryology, regarded the fertilized ovum 
and subsequent cleavage stages as the embryo and stated: "Stages of development 
are purely arbitrary. Development is a continuous process and one phase merges 
into another without any real point of demarcation." 13 
McCormick contends that a potential new moral status might be considered 
for the pre-embryo and, specifically, personhood may be related to the 
establishment of developmental individuality, which would mark the end of the 
pre-embryo period and the new time for ensoulment. He states that personhood 
cannot be decided by science. 14 
It is not a question as to whether science can or cannot decide the question of 
personhood. Science is not interested in deciding personhood. However, if the 
socio-Iegal status of personhood cannot be decided without invoking what is 
known scientifically, then the whole of scientific data should be used and not 
arbitrarily selected bits and pieces of data. 
Developmental Individuality 
McCormick's reliance on developmental individuality is derived from 
Grobstein's recently published "stages".15,16 Grobstein l7 ,18 claims the stage of 
developmental individuality is reached when division of the inner cell mass no 
longer can divide to produce twins or multiple identical individuals. Ancillary 
support for this contention comes from a report by the American Fertility 
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Society, which states that at least up to the eight-cell stage the developmental 
singleness of one person has not yet been established.22 This, quite simply, is not 
true. Seventy percent of all identical twins (monozygotic origin, that is, derived 
from one fertilized egg) are accounted for by division of the inner cell mass. The 
other 30% are accounted for by division at the two-cell to eight-cell stage of 
c1eavage.2o,21 Multiplicity of birth from dizygotic origin (two different ova) 
appears to be familial. However, the factors determining the origin of 
monozygotic multiplicity are not known, but, statistical data does not support a 
familial origin. The fact that 30% of all monozygotic twinning is determined in 
early cleavage stages strongly suggests that the singleness of all cases other than 
monozygotic twinning is determined at fertilization, or, perhaps at the first 
cleavage division. Compounding the problem explaining the onset of 
individuation is the fact that multiplicity beyond twinning may include a 
combination of dizygotic and monozygotic-derived embryos.21 
The fact is, not a shred of evidence exists which would explain the origin of 
monozygotic multiplicity. The kind of evidence which McCormick needs to 
support singleness occurring at the inner cell mass stage, and which would justify 
his "new moral status", is simply not in existence. 
The overwhelming majority of individuals on this earth now and since the 
beginning of homonid development have been, and are, derived from one 
fertilized egg without further separation of the blastomeres. If exceptions to this 
fact prompt a new definition for the right of ensoulment, it would be done for a 
very small fraction of the total human population now and in the future. Further, 
there would be no certain way ethically to withhold ensoulment from stages prior 
to formation of the blastocyst, because the factors or stimuli which produce 
monozygotic twins are not known and therefore not predictable. 
By designating developmental commitment to a single individual (singleness) 
as a determining factor for ensoulment, then in cases in which totipotentiality is 
lost early in development (called determinant cleavage), for example, in the 
annelids (worms), would there be an entitlement to ensoulment? Certainly there 
has never been a suggestion that the Catholic Church, nor any traditional 
religion, should recognize ensoulment for other than humans. Therefore, it would 
seem that the human quality would have to exist. This quality is established at 
fertilization. But, by qualifying this entitlement and restricting it to a later stage, 
such as the inner cell mass, the human quality is thereby equivocated. Indeed, a 
stronger case can be made for developmental individuality occurring at the time 
of fertilization of the ovum rather than at the inner cell mass stage. 
McCormick states that the potential for a fertilized egg to become an adult is a 
theoretical and statistical potential because only a small minority actually achieve 
this in the natural process.22 But, so what? What does that have to do with those 
zygotes which do successfully develop? A significant number of zygotes, 
embryos, fetuses and born individuals encounter biological faults, many of which 
precipitate early death before and after the inner cell mass stage. 
There are other significant facts about human development that are commonly 
misstated. For example, in the case of human development, we have traditionally 
believed in the totipotentiality of the cleaving blastomeres (cells) until the inner 
\ 
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cell mass stage (the blastocyst). But, not each blastomere has the same potential as 
the zygote, not even in cases where subsequently there might be a division of the 
inner cell mass into multiple copies of the embryo. Some of the blastomeres are 
destined to assume a peripheral position of the cleaving mass. During the 
formation of the blastocyst, these peripheral blastomeres will assume the identity 
of the trophoblast. The innermost blastomeres correspondingly, become 
distinguished from the peripheral-most cells by forming the inner cell mass. 
Positional differences are not to be exempted from consideration of 
totipotentiality. 
McCormick states the organization of the inner cell mass into two layers 
(referred to as the bilaminar embryo) is reflected by the formation of the 
primitive streak.23 That is incorrect. The appearance of the streak marks the 
beginning of the formation of the trilaminar embryo. 
It has also been reported by Short that it is untrue that identical twins may have 
progressed through two distinct inner cell masses at the fifth day.24 They certainly 
could have and could have been derived from separate earlier stages, which 
would have been derived from early monozygotic twinning.20 Short also states if 
"cleavage of the embryo is delayed until eight or more days after fertilization, the 
two resulting embryos have come from a single inner cell mass, and share one 
common set of all placental membranes." If twinning is delayed until eight or 
more days after fertilization, the two resulting twins will share a common 
placenta, but also a common amnion. They represent an anomalous condition 
and are rarely born alive.20 
Functional Individuality 
The arbitrary nature of Grobstein's "stage of developmental individuality" 
may be seen in his other examples: He defines the onset of junctional individuality 
"by the beating of a simple two-chambered heart. "18 In the human, the first beats 
are irregular and occur prior to the presence of any blood to be moved. This 
occurs by the 22nd day post-fertilization;2S some texts may indicate it occurs a bit 
later. The first contraction may be considerably earlier, perhaps 4 to 5 days 
earlier. 26 As development proceeds more blood corpuscles are formed, 
accumulate in the fusing blood channels, and the beats (contractions) become 
progressively more regular and stronger due to the formation and arrangement of 
more cardiac muscle cells. By this time, the beat of the heart becomes detectable. 
At what point would it be most appropriate to assign functional individuality? 
Can a case be made for functional individuality occurring when the first 
contractile unit in the first myoblast cell is formed? Or when the paired 
endocardial tubes are formed? Or when the cardiogenic cords are differentiated? 
Or when the first potential cardiac cell migrates to the presumptive heart area? 
Are these important questions? Not to the embryologist. The simple reason is 
that we recognize that all of development is a continuum, and any point in 
development derives its significance from the most previous point in 
development. 
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Psychic Individuality 
McCormick ties his argument for a reassessment of the time of ensoulment to 
the "light of scientific data."27 But the "scientific data" he cites has been highly 
selected and leaves out the overwhelming amount of "data." Another example of 
Grobstein's stages is that of psychic individuality (1989, p. 44) which, he states, 
occurs at 26 weeks, but admits that point in time is "arbitrary."18 He claims that 
time may change with more knowledge. He identifies this stage as sentience and 
relates it to the onset of thought. Those claiming sentience in the human fetus 
usually cite as evidence the recordings of brain waves. What studies have been 
made demonstrating brain wave recordings at 26 weeks offetal age? A search of 
the literature within the last II years indicates that no studies have been 
conducted on 26 week old fetuses. Those studies using electroencephalogram 
(EEG) recordings have been done during labor on full-term fetuses. Actually, 
these are not studies. They are either case reports or highly selected data. Some 
recordings have apparently been made at approximately 28 weeks presumably 
on premature births, but possibly on elective abortions.28 The waves are anarchic 
and asymmetric. They are different from the newborns which, in turn, are very 
different from a juvenile or an adult. 
Sentience, awareness of one's self, is a concept born of psychology. Thought 
must have an historical component, such as a record or interview. The newborn 
does not respond to vocal commands. On that basis, a newborn does not reveal 
thought. If one is testing alertness by an EEG, then psychic individuality is 
reduced to the ability of enough neurons developing enough electrical potential 
to move a stylus on a graph. Further, one would be recording "alertness' of 
neurons, not necessarily the individual, one of the reasons being that many 
interneurons are added post-birth up to two years of age. Those who regularly 
perform EEGs on newborns will admit it is not an easy task and interpretation is 
not a simple matter. Brain wave recordings might be refined later with 
microstructuring of the detection apparatus and perhaps could be eventually the 
result of the very first synapse formed, which would then place the time in the 
embryo stage at 8 to 9 weeks post fertilization, or before. But, what about the 
preparative events prior to production of detectable electrical potential, the 
growth ofaxons, dendritic connection and synthesis of appropriate enzymes? 
Have they no significance? 
Conclusion 
In sum, for the human embryo, a new stage of human development, which 
would be excluded from a moral status (ensoulment) should have full scientific 
support for such a new stage. Such is not the case. Church documents used in 
recognizing the rights of the conceptus have not had their scientific bases, as yet, 
abrogated. If moral reconsiderations of ensoulment are based on scientific data, 
as McCormick states they should be, all available scientific data should be used 
and not be selective or arbitrary. 
The scientist, in this case the human embryologist, should have no political 
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or theological agenda. There is no dilemma such as accounting for doctrinal or 
moral error when defining scientific data. Yet, we recognize from time to time the 
importance of what we observe, not just with respect to the next scientific 
question but with respect to our place in all of creation and within the order of all 
things in the universe. 
To that end, present Catholic doctrine appears to recognize the supreme 
significance of fertilization, that of the "new individual" being an extension of the 
unbroken continuum of life which began some 4.5 billion years ago. More than 
that, each fertilized egg represents the consequence of a biological history of all of 
the sucesses of that continuum and its survival against unceasing environmental 
'. assaults. Minor exceptions notwithstanding, our biological redemption lies 
within our biological history which is unified at the moment of fertilization. 
Epilogue 
There is no stage in human development as the pre-embryo. No such stage (or 
any stage) exists which could be the basis for equivocating the presence of a living 
entity, its quality of being human, its status as a human individual or, in the case 
of religious consideration, time of ensoulment. The reason why this is true is the 
following: from the moment when the sperm makes contact with the ovum, 
under conditions we have come to understand and describe as normal all 
subsequent development to birth of a living newborn is a/ail accompli That is to 
say, after that initial contact of sperm and egg there is no subsequent moment or 
stage which is held in arbitration or abeyance by the mother, or the embryo or 
fetus. Nor is a second contribution, a signal or trigger, needed from the male in 
order to continue and complete full development to birth. Human development 
is a continuum in which so-called stages overlap and blend one into another, even 
after birth and unto death. 
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